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i develop an account of covert institutional facts by examining sacred objects, witches, 
shamans and exorcists. i present an account of sacred objects as covert institutional 
entities, and distinguish between true beliefs that help create the institutional facts and 
false beliefs about their origin and/or their physical powers.
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While religions as such are not institutions (Searle 2010, 92, 161), all 
religions contain “a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, 
pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations in men” (geertz 1973, 
90). the capacity of institutional facts to create deontic powers and desire-
independent reasons for action is a central claim in Searle’s theory of 
institutions and will not be discussed in this paper. the deontic aura of 
sacred objects was brilliantly captured by clifford geertz. “religion”, he 
writes, “is never merely metaphysics. For all peoples the forms, vehicles, 
and objects of worship are suffused with an aura of moral seriousness. the 
holy bears within it everywhere a sense of intrinsic obligation; it not only 
encourages devotion, it demands it; it not only induces intellectual assent, it 
enforces emotional commitment […]. the powerfully coercive ‘ought’ is felt 
to grow out of a comprehensive factual ‘is’ […].”(geertz 1973, 126).
geertz’ description brilliantly illuminates how rituals, rights and obligations 
are attached to, and engendered by, symbols and symbolic objects and how 
they create, in Searle’s apt terminology, desire-independent reasons for the 
participants involved in the practice. moreover, it seems to be a universal 
feature of sacred objects that they impose commitments upon those who 
accept and/or recognize them (a second Searlean feature of institutional 
facts). The determination of the hours of worship or the offering of sacrifices 
presupposes a realm of concrete objects (places, times, etc.) that count as 
sacred. these considerations should not be confused with the function of 
calling something “sacred”. the use of the predicate “is sacred” often carries 
a colour that expresses reverence and awe (Frege 1918). the Fregean approach 
acknowledges that meaning and colour can come apart in systematic ways: 
you, qua outsider, can grant that an object is believed to be sacred (in a 
community c) without thereby expressing any (positive or negative) attitude 
towards it. What follows is a theory about sacredness as an institutional 
property of objects, not a theory about what is expressed by when the 
predicate is used. 
Consider a fictitious case. mount Popzatetl is, according to a collective g (“the 
tribe”) a sacred mountain. call the proposition members of g believe to 
be true (the proposition that mount Popzatetl is sacred) h. let g designate a 
collective whose members recognize/accept h, which is essential for mount 
Popzatetl’s (designated by the X-term in the constitutive rule) being holy (its 
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agentive function, designated by the y-term). Because a god born on mount 
Popzatetl’s summit explains, for members of g, why it is a sacred mountain, 
members of g will deny that its holiness is an institutional property, even 
if more theoretically-minded members of g (perhaps those who were 
graduate students at Berkeley but returned to their community) are willing 
to accept Searle’s theory as a sensible account of bona fide institutional facts 
(e.g., money or borders). depending on their tolerance for other religious 
practices (and articulating their view in Searlean terms), they could 
maintain the sacredness of another mountain (recognized by members of a 
different community g*) to be merely a covert institutional fact (members 
of g believe their gods are the only ones that really exist). members of g 
could also hold that the beliefs of community g* are false. members of g 
accept deontic powers that emerge from, or are associated with, the sacred 
mountain. they know that it is impermissible for children to climb mount 
Popzatetl, and that senior members of the collective must be buried on a 
day the full moon appears behind its summit. these deontic properties – a 
complex system of permissions, obligations, rights and duties that relate 
mt Popzatetl to individuals in g and actions they may or may not perform 
– have their origin in a natural fact, not in an acknowledged institution, 
although they may agree that rituals involving the mountain may have 
arbitrary or even conventional features. members of g deny that what 
Searle presents as the key function of creating institutional facts, applies to 
deontic powers derived from h’s truth: 
[…] the whole point of the creation of institutional reality is not to invest 
objects or people with some special status valuable in itself, but to create and 
regulate power relationships between people(Searle 2010, 106).
For members of g, mount Popzatetl’s intrinsic value is conferred upon it via a 
relational property: a supernatural event that imposed a sacred character on it. 
error theories assume that talk about institutional facts is “a mere 
collection of roundabout ways of talking about other things” (Smith 2007, 
11). the error theorist holds that the extension of the concept expressed by 
the predicate “is holy” is empty; talk purportedly referring to sacredness is 
therefore false or misguided, a bit in the same way that talk about witches 
is misguided (Searle tentatively defends an error theory about witches in 
Searle 2006, and we’ll return to his arguments in sections 3 and 4).1 two 
1 error theories about race have been defended by appiah (1996). musgrave (1999) and Searle 
(2006a) defend anti-realism about witches (See infra). 
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important considerations of John mackie (1977) can be applied in this 
context: predicates like “is sacred” (and the concept of sacredness) share 
with moral predicates both relativity and queerness. the argument from 
relativity points to the empirical observation that moral views can vary 
enormously and moral disagreements are very often characterized by a high 
degree of intractability. mackie concluded that moral judgments merely 
“reflect adherence to and participation in different ways of life” (Mackie 
1977, 36). there are strong disagreements about what is and what isn’t sacred 
and wars are fought over who “owns” a sacred place. Such disagreements 
and disputes are clearly not empirically decidable. Should we not therefore 
conclude that sacredness fails to designate a property and that talk of 
sacred mountains is purely expressive?
the argument from queerness has a metaphysical and an epistemological 
reading. the metaphysical reading holds that sacredness, like moral concepts, 
would designate “qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different 
from anything else in the universe” (mackie 1977, 38). the epistemological 
reading adds that in order to track such properties we would need some 
special faculty of moral perception or intuition which, when applied to sacred 
objects, would amount to an even stranger faculty, one that would allow us 
to discern instantiations of sacredness. Under an epistemological reading, 
the queerness argument holds that being sacred is not an objective fact to 
which some people or cultures (but not all) have superior epistemic access (as 
Joyce 2010, xvii puts it). Sacredness shares non-factuality with other concepts 
that have no application, like phlogiston or witchcraft. however, assimilating 
the property of being sacred to a phlogiston-type error begs the question: 
the latter was always intended to be an empirical predicate. moreover, the 
analogous claim that money doesn’t exist is implausible (and sound naive). 
money and borders are bona fide institutional entities.2 there is no reason to 
assume that because people have false supernatural beliefs about the origin 
of relational properties of certain institutions or institutional entities, this is 
sufficient to deny them existence.
moreover, error theories cannot explain how and why mistakes are 
corrected. Suppose a member of g observes mount Popzatetl from an 
unusual angle and denies that that mountain is holy. his mistake will be 
corrected by others members of g, or even by outsiders: “no, that mountain 
is holy” is the sensible thing to reply. “you are pointing at mount Popzatetl’. 
error theories deprive not only members of g, but also outsiders, of 
2 i owe this suggestion to an anonymous referee. 
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knowledge, i.e. true justified beliefs which can be shared with non-believers 
and be passed on to future generations. 
and yet, the error theory suggests an important objection to the 
institutional theory. Suppose you grant that a member of g knows that h.3 
Knowledge requires that no false belief enter into the justification for the 
belief that h (if a false belief q enters the justification of one’s belief p, then 
the latter belief, even if true, cannot be counted as knowledge – this is an 
important lesson drawn from the famous “no false lemma” requirement on 
knowledge, see lehrer 1965). But isn’t this the case when the belief that a god 
was born on Mount Popzatetl figures in the justification of the belief that H?
i suggest the correct answer should be that members of g may be ignorant 
of, or have false beliefs about, the social explanation of what enabled them 
to know that h: they lack knowledge (or have false beliefs) about the social 
aetiology of their belief. members of g need not know the exact nature of 
what enabled them to know that h, in order to know that h. the false belief 
helps to provide justification for the (false) belief that h is a natural fact, a belief 
whose content differs from the unqualified belief that H. There is a difference 
between knowing that H (a justified true belief) and believing (falsely) that the 
proposition that h describes (is true about) a natural fact. the mistake is not 
in the belief that h, but in the belief that the mountain’s being sacred has its origin 
in a natural (or supernatural) fact, which justifies the further, and false, belief 
that mount Popzatetl’s holiness was not the result of collective acceptance 
among members of g of (the proposition that) h. outsiders know that mount 
Popzatetl is sacred because they are told so by a reliable source (a senior 
member of g, say), and, if you follow Searle’s account of institutional facts, we 
outsiders also know in virtue of what that belief is true (it is true in virtue of 
an institutional property, created and maintained by a collective). Similarly, 
the belief of members of G - that Mount Popzatetl is holy - is justified by their 
belief that they were told so - that the scriptures, or the tradition says so, which, for 
them, should be (and often is) the end of the story.4 
externalists or reliabilists about knowledge hold that at least some 
privileged members of g (but not necessarily outsiders) will be reliable 
3 note that members of g may have false beliefs about other communities. if they hold that 
their mountain is the only holy mountain in the universe, they are mistaken. 
4 there is a difference between explaining why mount Popzatetl is holy, and justifying one’s 
belief that it is holy. The latter is justified by evidence, and the only legitimate evidence is that 
“one is being told so” (it is essentially knowledge by testimony). their own explanation of its 
sacred nature is of course mistaken. 
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sources of knowledge about what is and what isn’t sacred in their 
community. reliabilists should therefore have even less problems with 
the fact that mount Popzatetl is known to be holy than their internalist 
counterparts. and perhaps interpretive charity also plays a role here: while 
one may deplore the existence of a sacred object - perhaps because its 
deontic aura directly or indirectly legitimizes a particularly cruel treatment 
of women, for example - one shouldn’t neglect that making members of g’s 
beliefs and actions intelligible to themselves and to us is crucial. in order to 
eventually enlighten them about the institutional nature of their sacred 
mountain, part of what it takes to make them intelligible is to ascribe true 
and false beliefs to them. the institutional account suggests which truths 
and which falsehoods make their actions intelligible. 
insider concepts and descriptions can be understood by outsiders (pace 
cultural relativists, see davidson 1974, 2001), but such understanding does 
not require joining members of g, to the extent that one thereby becomes 
co-responsible for maintaining h, let alone that they will maintain that h is 
(expresses) a non-institutional fact. This would conflate understanding with 
conversion. there is a distinction between collectives that are responsible 
for (unintentionally) maintaining an institutional fact, and an “enlightened” 
community that has a full understanding of its institutional aetiology. 
note again, that in this respect too, the institutional approach cannot be 
extended to cases like phlogiston (“Before lavoisier, phlogiston existed as an 
unintended institutional fact’). those who believed phlogiston existed were 
self-consciously involved in empirical research and, at least in principle, open 
to falsifying evidence. Moreover, they could, independently of a falsification of 
the theory, accept the distinction between natural and institutional facts, and 
they would classify phlogiston, even on their own (false) account, correctly as 
a natural phenomenon (“if it exists, it is a natural phenomenon’). all parties 
involved in the phlogiston-controversy during the 18th century agreed that 
the concept, if it had an extension, designated a natural phenomenon that 
afforded empirical investigation. neither did phlogiston’s existence create 
specific deontic powers; there should therefore not be a temptation to hold 
that now, for us, the existence of phlogiston is an institutional (and not 
natural) fact. no rights and duties are created by letting some substance count 
as phlogiston. 
an error theory about sacredness is therefore not a priori entailed by 
the very plausible belief that gods don’t exist and can’t be born on top of 
mountains. on this point, atheists and reluctant outsiders are sometimes 
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in a position where they should grudgingly acknowledge the existence of 
sacred mountains, a bit like the anti-nazi had to acknowledge that hitler 
had a government (Searle 2010, 8, 57). as pointed out earlier, meaning and 
colour of the predicate “is sacred” come apart when outsiders speak about 
mount Popzatetl’s sacredness from their spectatorial point of view.
my claim is now that sacred objects can be covert institutional facts and 
in our toy example they do function like that. members of g do create 
a sacred object, but they would not acknowledge that “creating mount 
Popzatetl’s sacredness” correctly specifies what they do (they certainly 
wouldn’t acknowledge that they declared that mount Popzatetl was a sacred 
mountain). Similarly, they would not believe any presentation of facts about 
their mountain which explicitly or implicitly presents the target property 
to be an institutional one. Searle explicitly accepts that people may have 
mistaken beliefs about the nature of specific institutional facts, objects or 
properties:
most of these things (the creation of institutional facts, fB) develop quite 
unconsciously, and indeed people typically are not even aware of the structure 
of institutional reality. it often works best when they have false beliefs about it. 
So there are a lot of people in the united States who still believe that a dollar is 
only really money because it is backed by all that gold in fort Knox. This is total 
fantasy, of course. The gold has nothing to do with it. and people hold other false 
beliefs. They believe someone is king only because he is divinely inspired, or even 
believe that marriages have been made by god in heaven, and so on (Searle 2001, 
37-38) 5. 
there are interesting ambiguities in Searle’s claims. is the belief that certain 
institutions are consequences of a divine will conceptually coherent, given 
the theory of institutions just developed? members of g lack beliefs, or have 
false beliefs about the social enabling conditions of what they believe or 
know, but those false beliefs need not be part of their justification of their 
belief that h. recall that even though X (a member of g) has a false belief 
about what determines the extension of the concept of being sacred, this 
need not entail that X does not know that mount Popzatetl is holy, just 
as the false belief that elisabeth ii is the Queen because she was divinely 
elected (“Elisabeth II, by the grace of God” is part of the Queen’s official title) 
does not entail that Uk citizens do not know that elisabeth ii is the queen 
or that queens don’t exist. the false belief is about the divine origin of her 
5 compare (Searle 2010, 107)
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monarchic powers, and there may be further ignorance or even patently 
false beliefs about the social enabling conditions of that belief. in this sense, 
false beliefs can contribute to the maintenance of covert institutional facts 
and even covert institutions.6
  
a theory that holds that the institutional character of a fact or object can 
be hidden or covert for a community c acknowledges the error theorist’s 
point, made earlier, that institutional properties are in some sense relative 
and queer: their assignation is relative to a practice and within a community; 
they are queer because institutional properties are by definition not 
natural ones. although an institutional account is in principle purely 
descriptive (See supra), there is an aspect of the institutional account that 
allows its proponents to be “critical of the status quo” (as hacking 1999 puts 
it): since members of a collective are de facto responsible for the creation 
and maintenance of an institutional fact, but can be ignorant about its 
institutional nature, uncovering its institutional nature to them may in 
fact lead to a critical re-examination of the practice. criticizing, perhaps 
abolishing certain deontic powers attached to sacred objects can best be 
initiated by explicitly and publicly exposing the object in the X-position 
as having an institutional property y.7 once you come to believe there are 
no gods born on top of mount Popzatetl, you are open to the fact that its 
sacred character was merely due to collective acceptance. once it is fully 
appreciated by members of g that collective acceptance is responsible for 
the creation and maintenance of the sacred nature of mount Popzatetl, 
they eo ipso discover that the deontic powers attached to it have sublunar 
origins, and that insight might be the beginning of a thorough revision 
of those powers, perhaps leading to their gradual erosion and eventual 
disappearance (compare the gradual reduction of the monarch’s real 
powers to the purely ceremonial role of kings in modern constitutional 
democracies).z various moves and options that come with the insight 
that a practice is based not on natural facts but on institutional ones can 
be described within John Searle’s theory of institutional facts: one starts 
seeing the holiness of mount Popzatetl as an observer-dependent fact that 
obtains its status due to collective intentionality. one thereby comes to see 
that acceptance/recognition of mount Popzatetl’s holiness is a necessary 
conditions for its function to surpass the physical features of the object.
6  Bruno celano argues that “[…] pace Searle, institutional facts being belief dependent is 
not compatible with people having false beliefs about them” (celano 1999, 249, also quoted (and 
rejected) in lagerspetz 2006, 302). 
7  compare the child who pointed out that the emperor has no clothes. 
COVERT INSTITuTIONAlITy: SACRED MOuNTAINS, WITCHES AND ExORCISTS
FiliP BUekenS  Tilburg university, university of leuven
77
and one starts to accept that h does not exclude that other mountains can 
be sacred too (and that this requires different contexts). it is recognized 
that a socially determined enabling condition for the emergence of knowing 
that mount Popzatetl is sacred was key to the emergence of that belief. they 
will accept that it was human agency that did the imposition of holiness. 
once this insight transpires, h can continue to exist or disintegrate, and be 
studied, perhaps in the context of a Foucauldian “archaeology” of now fully 
disintegrated institutions, forgotten institutional properties and eroded or 
merely symbolic deontic powers. to avoid expressing reverence and awe, an 
outsider can assert the proposition that mount Popzatetl is sacred because they, 
members of g, collectively accept it as holy. 
this avoids the relativism implicit in “according to them, mount Popzatetl 
is holy’, which should be avoided (recall that outsiders too know that 
mount Popzatetl is holy). ex-members of g who come to believe that h is 
true in virtue of collective acceptance of h continue to grasp the concept 
of holiness. 
What about witches, shamans, and exorcists? i will argue that the existence 
of witches, shamans and exorcists should be acknowledged, as these status 
functions are associated with, and known to be associated with certain 
deontic powers. nevertheless, those who accept that they exist and who 
recognize their deontic powers, may have many false beliefs, perhaps not 
about the cover or over institution that assigns these statuses, but about the 
supernatural powers of the persons that have a specific. Consider witches. 
Searle holds the following view about witches:
many people believe in the existence of witches and they act on that belief even 
to the extent of executing people for witchcraft. all the same, on the standard 
supernatural definition of witches there are no witches and there never have 
been any (Searle 2006, 115).
Searle judges here in view of the standard supernatural definition of 
witches (“women who had intercourse with the devil”) and on that account 
there could not be witches. i take this to be part of what fixes the reference 
of the concept of being a witch. an alternative account allows for the 
consistency of the following set of claims (applied to witches): witches once 
existed and are known to have existed, but there was never such a thing as 
witchcraft. Witchcraft is based on false empirical beliefs. Witches existed 
because they were created by (implicit, covert) collective acceptance that 
there are witches, and their social role can be defined in terms of a set of 
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interconnected rights and obligations, implicitly or explicitly conferred 
upon them by the community. this is even more evident in the case of 
shamans, whose social role in a community is precisely defined: they are 
respected, must be consulted at certain occasions, and have various rights 
and obligations. they create and are owners of desire-independent reasons. 
on the proposed account of witches as covert institutional entities, it is 
(objectively, historically) true that the last witch in england was burned 
in 1736, and there is no need to tinker with the truth-conditions of the 
sentence (replacing “witch” by some description – “the last person 
convicted of witchcraft”, for example). even though the reference of the 
concept of a witch is, within a community responsible for their existence, 
fixed by “woman who had sexual intercourse with the devil” (or some 
such reference-fixing description that reflects how many or most believers 
stereotypically thought about witches), this need not determine its 
extension, as we saw earlier in the case of the concept of sacredness. What 
determines that there are witches (what determines the extension of the 
concept of a witch) is an aetiology in which someone (X) was declared to 
count as a witch (y). But those who issued such declaratives may well have 
been wrong about what they did: rather than thereby creating witches, they 
thought they announced the discovery that this or that person turned out to 
be witch. Being a witch was, relative to them, a covert institutional property. 
they didn’t realize they were involved in an institutional practice that 
created rather than discovered entities.
Neither does the fact that women confessed to certain deeds (flying on 
broomsticks, etc.) commonly or stereotypically associated with witchcraft 
or even consciously or unconsciously started behaving according to the 
reference-fixing description made it true that there were once witches. The 
fact that being a witch is an “interactive kind” (à la hacking 1999) is neither 
sufficient nor necessary to explain the existence of witches. What did make 
it true that witches existed was collective acceptance of a real or virtual 
declarative, issued by some authority and accepted/recognized by others, 
that someone was a witch, and that in virtue of being a witch, certain 
deontic powers came into existence. We can therefore accept that witches 
existed, and simultaneously deny that witchcraft existed. 
in the case of shamans and exorcists the case for their institutional nature 
is even more clearer: the role of a shaman within a community is clearly 
defined in terms of what do’s and don’ts, rights and duties. Moreover, many 
cultures make a clear distinction between laity and the shaman, and merely 
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talking and acting like a shaman does not entail that one is a recognized 
shaman. in the catholic religion a distinction is made between a formal 
exorcism which can only be conducted by a priest during a baptism or with 
permission of a bishop. the exorcist is an individual thought to be capable of 
expelling demons, using formulas, gestures, symbols and amulets. in islam, 
ruqya is used to repair damage caused by witchcraft. in Judaism exorcism 
rituals are performed by a rabbi who has mastered practical kabala. denying 
that they exist just because they are supposed to interact with supernatural 
entities does not seem to be an option, and it is not even correct to talk here, 
as in the case of the holy mountain, of covert institutional roles: an exorcist 
officially recognized by the Church has (real) deontic powers, but (contrary 
to what the church thinks) none of the alleged supernatural powers. 
one reason why the distinction between the existence of witches (they 
exist) and witchcraft (which doesn’t exist) is not obvious is that in our 
understandable eagerness to deny that witchcraft exists, and our current 
moral outrage against witch-hunts (or slavery), we easily jump to the facile 
and consoling conclusion that witches never existed, or that slavery was not an 
institution. But what Searle himself acknowledges as true about intended or 
overt institutional facts (that correctly identifying them as such need not 
entail that one endorses the institution – See supra) can be extended to covert 
institutional facts. What one should have said to would-be witch-burners 
is something like this: “yes, your collective acceptance of the declarative 
statement that these women are witches, has created the (non-empty) 
category of witches, but you are under an illusion about their alleged 
supernatural powers.” Publicly reciting this fragment of an analysis is 
definitely not the most effective strategy to persuade members of the relevant 
collective that they shouldn’t classify persons as witches. a public assertion 
that witches existed may carry the misleading implicature that witchcraft 
also exists, or perhaps even the more outrageous suggestion that it was after 
all right to burn them. the lesson seems to be that announcing a viable and 
conceptually kosher account of the ontology and epistemology of statements 
and beliefs about witches and the social enabling conditions for beliefs that 
they exist need not offer the most effective way to persuade people that 
certain women should not be treated as witches, and that what they took to be 
a natural phenomenon was in fact created by their beliefs. it takes a complex 
attitudinal shift within a community to instil such a conversion. 
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